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1

Introduction

How do price stickiness, uncertainty and risk aversion affect the equilibrium outcome of
an oligopoly where firms compete over the demand of a homogeneous, non-storable good?
This might be a relevant question for many markets. For instance, in the electricity market
end-use consumers are served by few firms selling a good which is perfectly homogeneous
and cannot be stored (at least at reasonable costs). Moreover, in these markets retail prices
adjust only very gradually to changes in market conditions. Thus, Bils and Klenow (2004)
estimate that the average monthly frequency of price changes in the US electricity market is
43.4 percent corresponding to an average time between price variations of about 1.8 months.
This is a particularly striking level of stickiness for retail prices, given that wholesale electricity prices change hour by hour (Borenstein and Holland, 2005). Price stickiness in electricity
markets is also a regulatory issue as it may represent an obstacle to efficient prices (Joskow
and Wolfram, 2012).
We answer to the question above by extending Fershtman and Kamiem’s differential game
for an oligopolistic market with sticky prices and a non-storable good to a formulation with
uncertainty and risk-aversion. We derive the optimal (sub-game perfect) production strategy, and the corresponding equilibrium price, and compare it to the Nash equilibria obtained by Fershtman and Kamien (1987). In our extension we show how uncertainty and
risk-aversion affect the steady state market equilibrium: as uncertainty or risk-aversion increases, oligopolistic firms are forced to produce more and consequently the equilibrium
price falls. Indeed, we see that risk-averse entrepreneurs find it optimal to increase production vis-à-vis their risk-neutral counterparts, as this leads to a smaller variability for
their future payoffs and hence reduces their risk-exposure. However, the impact of uncertainty and risk-aversion crucially depends on price stickiness, as we show that the stationary
equilibrium collapses to Fershtman and Kamien’s analogue when prices can adjust instantaneously.
Our paper contributes to the literature dealing with oligopolistic differential games. Applications of differential games are widespread and span across macroeconomics, international trade and environment economics (see Turnovsky, Basar, and D’Orey (1988), Dockner
and Haug (1990), van der Ploeg and De Zeeuw (1992) and Dockner and Long (1993) among
the others). In industrial organization differential games have been fruitfully employed to
investigate oligopolies characterized by adjustment costs (Driskill and McCafferty (1989),
Karp and Perloff (1989), Karp and Perloff (1993) and Wirl (2010), among the others) and
the first applications to an oligopoly problem with sticky prices are Simaan and Takayama
(1978) and Fershtman and Kamien (1987). Both papers employ the same continuous-time
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model with identical firms, a linear demand function, quadratic production costs and where
price stickiness is modeled by assuming that prices evolve according to a differential equation that is function of the difference between the actual price and the price that would clear
the market at the current level of production.
Fershtman and Kamien (1987) derive the equilibrium production and the corresponding
equilibrium price under both the hypotheses that firms employ open- and closed-loop (i.e.
feedback) strategies. Under the hypothesis of open-loop strategies firms decide a production
plan at time zero and stick to it forever while under the alternative hypothesis of feedback
strategies firms optimize their production decisions instant-by-instant, taking into account
the current price. Therefore, if a price reduction occurs under the feedback hypothesis, no
commitment is possible or credible and each firm increases its production. What emerges is
that the stationary level of production arising in a (symmetric) feedback Nash equilibrium
is greater than the stationary level of production arising in a (symmetric) open-loop equilibrium and both are greater than the equilibrium level of production of the corresponding
static Cournot game. Consequently the feedback equilibrium is characterized by a stationary price which is lower than the stationary price of the open-loop equilibrium that, in turn,
is lower than the equilibrium price of static Cournot game. Fershtman and Kamien (1987)
show also that, when price adjusts instantaneously, the stationary equilibrium price converges to the static Cournot equilibrium price if firms use open-loop strategies, while it
converges to a lower value if firms follow feedback strategies. Therefore, removing price
stickiness would not result in a dynamic oligopoly converging to its static counterpart as
this requires also that firms can pre-commit to their initial output strategies. This is intriguing since open-loop strategies are judged less interesting than feedback ones in the study of
dynamic games (Tsutsui and Mino, 1990) because they are generally not subgame perfect1 .
The model developed by Fershtman and Kamien (1987) has been extended in several directions. Dockner (1988), for instance, generalizes it to the case of more than two firms2
showing that the dynamic oligopoly price converges to the long run (zero profit) competitive
price when the number of firms goes to infinity, independent of the assumption of open-loop
or feedback strategies. Tsutsui and Mino (1990) introduce the possibility of price ceilings to
consider the case of nonlinear feedback strategies finding that, when the price ceiling is not
too high, feedback equilibrium prices can be higher than the equilibrium price that arises
under the linear feedback strategy assumed by Fershtman and Kamien (1987). Piga (2000)
shows that when firms can invest in advertising the nonlinear feedback equilibrium price
may be greater than the open-loop equilibrium price, while the latter is above the linear
1 See

Cellini and Lambertini (2004) for a short review of the papers showing under what conditions openloop strategies can be subgame perfect.
2 A similar extension is also developed by Cellini and Lambertini (2004).
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feedback equilibrium price. Other extensions include Dockner and Gaunerdorfer (2001) and
Benchekroun (2003) who analyze the profitability of horizontal mergers, Cellini and Lambertini (2007) dealing with the case of firms selling differentiated products, WiszniewskaMatyszkiel, Bodnar, and Mirota (2015) focusing on firms’ behavior off the steady state price
path, and the recent paper by Xin and Sun (2018) who deal with production planning and
water savings.
Our model nests the classical dynamic oligopoly with sticky prices of Fershtman and
Kamien (1987) that can be viewed as its continuous-time limit with no uncertainty and no
risk aversion. Our analysis starts from a discrete-time formulation of a dynamic oligopolistic market with sticky prices which allows to introduce uncertainty and risk-aversion in
a tractable manner by means of a special form of the recursive preferences proposed by
Hansen and Sargent (1995). Thus, we derive the optimal (sub-game perfect) production
strategy for symmetric firms and, focusing on the continuous-time limit of the infinite time
formulation, we obtain several results. Notably, in presence of demand volatility risk-averse
entrepreneurs choose to produce larger quantities of the non-storable good, vis-à-vis their
risk-neutral counterparts, since this reduces the variability of their payoffs. Such behavior is
exacerbated when demand shocks are more volatile and, as a result, the steady state value
of the equilibrium price results to be decreasing in both uncertainty and risk-aversion. The
same result applies when the number of firms rises as they are induced to sacrifice their
marginal revenues in the attempt to protect their market share.
Other interesting results are derived from the analysis of specific limit cases:
1. As it happens for the case without uncertainty and risk-aversion analyzed by Dockner
(1988), when the number of firms goes to infinity the steady state price converges to
the marginal cost. This is interesting because it shows that his result is robust with
respect to the introduction of uncertainty and risk-aversion.
2. When the time-discounting factor goes to zero the steady state price converges to the
value that would prevail in a static equilibrium with price-taker firms. In this case
firms behave as price-takers because they do not take their future profits into account
and, given the characterization of price stickiness, their production choices do not affect the current price level either.
3. The steady state price converges to the equilibrium value of a perfectly competitive
static market also when prices tend to be infinitely sticky. Obviously, here the result
arises because firms’ production choices can affect neither present nor future prices.
4. When prices become infinitely flexible the steady state price converges to a limit value
which is higher than the price of the static equilibrium with price-taker firms and
3
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lower than that of the static Cournot oligopoly. Since in a duopoly such limit case
coincides with the deterministic analogue discussed in Fershtman and Kamien (1987),
we see that the impact of uncertainty and risk-aversion on a dynamic oligopoly where
firms compete over the production of a homogeneous and non-storable good crucially
hinges on the presence of price-stickiness.
5. When we instead consider the special case of a unique firm in the market, we observe
that an infinitely flexible price brings about the convergence of the stationary price
towards the static Cournot price (coinciding in this case with the monopoly price).
In oligopoly, both in Fershtman and Kamien (1987) and in our paper, under the hypothesis
of perfectly flexible prices, the steady state price converges to a level which is lower than
the static Cournot equilibrium price because of the assumption of feedback strategies. Only
by removing this assumption, either by imposing open-loop strategies - as in Fershtman
and Kamien (1987) - or by eliminating the necessity of behaving strategically - as it is in our
paper when we consider the special case with only one firm - we allow the firms to precommit to an initial production strategy and the dynamic oligopoly to converge to its static
counterpart.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we first introduce uncertainty
and risk-aversion in a discrete-time formulation of a market for a non-storable good with
sticky prices, then we consider its continuous-time limit and characterize the equilibrium
solutions. In Section 3 we concentrate on the stationary solution for the infinite horizon formulation and derive important comparative statics results pertaining to the impact of riskaversion, uncertainty and the number of firms. Finally, Section 4 investigates what happens
to the stationary equilibrium of the infinite horizon formulation when time-discounting collapses to zero and when prices become either infinitely sticky or perfectly flexible. The
proofs of all results discussed in the paper relegated in a separate Appendix.

2

A Market for a Non-storable Good with Sticky Prices

We start from a discrete-time formulation of a market for a non-storable good with sticky
prices which allows to introduce uncertainty and risk-aversion in a simple, intuitive and
tractable manner. We then consider its continuous-time limit and derive several theoretical
results. The discrete-time formulation is set out so that its continuous-time limit is consistent with that of Fershtman and Kamien (1987). In this way we can unveil the impact of
uncertainty and risk-aversion on a market for a non-storable good with sticky prices, comparing our analysis vis-à-vis the existing literature on differential games for markets with
4
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price-inertia and imperfect competition.

2.1 A Discrete-time formulation
Let us assume that production and consumption take place at equally spaced in time moments between time 0 and time T. These moments are t1 , . . .,tn , tn+1 , . . ., t N , where tn+1 =
tn + ∆, with ∆ some positive interval of time, while t N coincides with the final date T in
which production is interrupted. This value can easily be pushed towards infinity to consider an infinite horizon formulation and consequently study a stationary equilibrium. Period n will correspond to time tn . The continuous-time limit will be reached when ∆ converges to zero. The discrete-time counterpart of the continuous-time formulation for the
dynamics of the price of the non-storable consumption good is as follows
p n +1

=

α s ∆ + (1 − s∆) pn − s∆xn + ϵn+1 ,

(1)

where pn is the price of the non-storable good at time tn , ∆xn is the corresponding quantity
produced and brought to the market, ϵn+1 is an idiosyncratic shock to its demand function,
with ϵn+1 ∼ N (0, σϵ2 ∆), while α and s are positive constants with s representing a measure
of the speed of price adjustment.
The quantity produced and brought to the market ∆xn is the product of the time interval
∆ and the output rate/intensity xn for period n.3 In oligopoly, where M identical firms
produce the non-storable good, ∆xn = ∆u1,n + ∆u2,n . . . + ∆u M,n , where ∆um,n corresponds
to the quantity produced by firm m in period n. This is the product of ∆ and firm m’s output
rate/intensity um,n .
The dynamics of the price described by the first-order difference equation (1) represents
the discrete time counterpart of that employed by Fershtman and Kamien (1987) and most
of the papers dealing with dynamic oligopolies and sticky prices. Equation (1) can be reformulated as
p n +1 − p n

=

s∆ ( p̂n − pn ) + ϵn+1 ,

(2)

where p̂n = α − xn is the inverse demand function which prevails in a market in which
prices adjust immediately to the level determined by the demand function for a given level
of output. Equation (2) shows that in our formulation the price does not adjust instantaneously to reach this static equilibrium price. Because of price stickiness the adjustment
process takes time and in fact equation (2) indicates that the price variation from period n to
3 Fershtman

and Kamien refer to ui as firm i’s output rate.
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period n + 1 is a linear function of the of the gap between the price indicated by the demand
function for the currently produced quantity and the current market price. The degree of
price stickiness depends on the constant parameter s that measures how much of the difference between p̂n and pn is corrected in a period of time. Thus, a larger s would allow a
faster convergence of the price to its static equilibrium level with immediate convergence
when s goes to infinity. On the other hand, when s = 0 we have maximum stickiness and a
limit case is reached in which changes in the production level do not provoke any variation
in prices. Moreover, it is worthwhile to note that what firms produce today has an effect on
tomorrow price but it does not affect the current price pn whose level depends, in turn, on
production decisions occurred at tn−1 . As it will be clearer later, this assumption is crucial
for the results that we derive.
In order to concentrate on symmetric equilibria we assume the M firms are perfectly symmetrical in that they share the same cost function, while the entrepreneurs which own and
run them share the same degree of risk-aversion.4
Now, without loss of generality, let us analyze the optimal production strategy of firm 1.
As in Fershtman and Kamien (1987) firm 1 is characterized by quadratic production costs.
Specifically, in n the intensity of these costs is 21 u2n , where for simplicity we write u1,n = un .
The sale of the non-storable good generates a revenue which is linear in the quantity brought
to the market. This implies that the intensity of the firm’s revenue in n is pn un , while that of
the corresponding profits is pn un − 12 u2n .
In Fershtman and Kamien (1987) the entrepreneur maximizes the discounted value of all
the profits her firm generates. In our formulation, as the future prices at which the firm will
be able to sell the quantity of the non-storable good it produces are subject to idiosyncratic
shocks, this discounted value is uncertain. Therefore, we assume the entrepreneur is riskaverse and is endowed with a special form of recursive preferences proposed by Hansen
and Sargent (Hansen and Sargent, 1995). In particular in period n, with n = 1, 2, . . . , N, the
entrepreneur solves the following recursive optimization
{

Vn

=

min
un

( ρ
)])
2 ( [
ln En exp δ∆ V n+1
∆cn +
ρ
2

}
,

(3)

where ρ (with ρ > 0) is a risk-enhancement coefficient, δ (with 0 < δ < 1) is a timediscounting factor, ∆cn is the (per-period) loss function, with cn =

1 2
2 un

− pn un , and V n

is the value function (with final condition V N +1 = 0).
The optimization criterion in (3) accommodates risk-aversion through the curvature of
4 With

different degrees of risk-aversion on the part of the M entrepreneurs we would not be able to concentrate on symmetric equilibria.
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ρ

the exponential function. As the convexity of ln( E[exp(δ∆ 2 V n+1 )]) increases with ρ, this
coefficient determines the entrepreneur’s degree of risk-aversion. Importantly, for ρ ↓ 0,
the recursive optimization in (3) converges to V n = minun En [∆cn + δ∆ V n+1 ].5 As this is
the Bellman equation a risk-neutral entrepreneur will solve in our formulation, we conclude
that our formulation subsumes that of Fershtman and Kamien, when ρ = 0, and extends it
by allowing for risk-sensitive preferences, when ρ > 0.
Exploiting results by Vitale (2017) the following Lemma can be established.
Lemma 1 When M identical firms operate in the oligopolistic market for the production of the nonstorable good, in period n the optimal production strategy of a generic firm is
un = κ p,n pn + κe,n (αs∆π̃n+1 − ϑ̃n+1 ) , with
κ p,n =

1
2

+ s(1 − s∆)π̃n+1
,
1
2
2 + M s ∆ π̃n+1

κe,n =

1
2

π̃n+1 = δ∆ πn+1 (1 − δ∆ ρ σϵ2 ∆ πn+1 )−1 ,
πn =

s
,
+ Ms2 ∆π̃n+1

ϑ̃n+1 = δ∆ ϑn+1 (1 − δ∆ ρ σϵ2 ∆ πn+1 )−1 ,

[
]2
1 2
∆ κ p,n − ∆ κ p,n + (1 − s∆) − M s ∆ κ p,n π̃n+1 ,
2

ϑn = [1 − ( M − 1)sπ̃n+1 ∆ κe,n ][− Ms ∆ κ p,n + (1 − s∆)](ϑ̃n+1 − αs∆π̃n+1 )

(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

and boundary conditions π N +1 = 0 and ϑ N +1 = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Solving the recursive system of equations (5), (6), (7) and (8) for n = 1, 2, . . . , N, with the
boundary conditions π N +1 = 0 and ϑ N +1 = 0 is fairly cumbersome and can be achieved
only numerically. However, we are interested in investigating what happens when we consider the continuous-time limit, for ∆ ↓ 0.

2.2 The Continuous-time Limit
For ∆ ↓ 0 this discrete-time formulation converges to a continuous-time limit. In particular,
the continuous-time analogue of equation (1) is given by the following expression
dp(t)
dt

=

s(α − x (t) − p(t)) + ϵ(t) ,

(9)

where x (t) = u1 (t) + . . . + u M (t). Importantly, for M = 2 and ϵ(t) ≡ 0 we have equation
(1.2) in Fershtman and Kamien (1987). Given our formulation the condition that no variation
5 The

proof of these and other results are available on request. See also Vitale (2017).
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in the price is expected is

[
Et

dp(t)
dt

]

= 0.

It can be said that if this condition is met the good market is in steady state in that the good
price p(t) adjusts instantaneously to the equilibrium level that would prevail in a static
model. In our dynamic model prices are sticky. When a production decision is taken, the
good price does not reach immediately its static equilibrium value. However, let p∗ (t) ≡
α − x (t) be such a price. Substituting it out in equation (9) we find that
dp(t)
dt

=

− s ( p(t) − p∗ (t)) + ϵ(t) ,

(10)

which is the continuous-time correspondent of equation (2) unveiling mean-reverting dynamics toward the static equilibrium price.
Using Lemma 1 it is possible to prove the following Proposition, which characterizes the
optimal production strategy of the generic firm in the continuous-time limit.
Proposition 1 When M identical firms operate in the oligopolistic market for the production of the
non-storable good, in t the optimal production strategy of the generic firm is
u(t) = κ (t) p(t) − 2 s ϑ (t), with κ (t) = (1 + 2 sπ (t))

(11)

and π (t) and ϑ (t) satisfying the following differential equations
)(
)
(
dπ (t)
1
1
(2M − 1)sπ (t) +
+ (ln δ − 2s)π (t) + ρσϵ2 π (t)2 = 0 , (12)
− 2 sπ (t) +
dt
2
2
(
)
(
)
dϑ (t)
+ ln δ − (1 + M)s ϑ(t) − 2(2M − 1)s2 − ρσϵ2 π (t)ϑ(t) − αs π (t) = 0 , (13)
dt
with boundary conditions π ( T ) = 0 and ϑ ( T ) = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Solving the two differential equations in Proposition 1 is involved. In particular, an explicit solution exists only for the former and hence numerical procedures are called for to
describe the dynamics of the equilibrium presented in Proposition 1. However, in the infinite horizon formulation, where the final date T is pushed forward to infinite, we easily
characterize the stationary equilibrium. Indeed, using the differential equations (12) and
(13), we can establish that in such stationary equilibrium
κ (t) = κ̄ , π (t) = π̄ and ϑ (t) = ϑ̄ , where
8
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κ̄ = 1 + 2sπ̄ , π̄ = −

απ̄s
1λ 1D
+
and ϑ̄ =
,
2γ 2 γ
ln δ − s (1 + M ) − γ π̄

(
)
with λ = 2(1 + M )s − ln δ , γ = 2(2M − 1)s2 − ρσϵ2 and D = [λ2 − 2γ]1/2 .

The characteristics of κ̄, π̄ and ϑ̄ are discussed in the Appendix. In particular, by investigating the sign of κ̄, π̄ and ϑ̄ we will establish also the required positiveness of the
equilibrium price and the expected quantity produced by any oligopolistic firm.

3

Comparative Statics

As we concentrate on the stationary solution for the infinite horizon formulation, we have
several important results pertaining to the impact of risk-aversion, the volatility of the demand shocks and the number of firms operating in the market.

3.1 Risk-aversion and Uncertainty
The following Lemma provides a first hint on the relationship between risk-aversion, uncertainty and firms’ production strategies.
Lemma 2 In the stationary equilibrium, the production strategy of an oligopolistic firm is more
aggressive for a larger ρ and/or larger σϵ , in that κ̄ is larger.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This Lemma posits that the firm will select a more aggressive production strategy when
more risk-averse and when more uncertain about future shocks to the demand function.
Indeed, in a stationary equilibrium the price of the homogeneous non-storable good fluctuates around a steady state value p∗ . Correspondingly, the quantity produced by a firm
in a stationary equilibrium, u(t) = κ̄ p(t) − 2sϑ̄, fluctuates around the steady state value
u∗ = κ̄ p∗ − 2sϑ̄. Since κ̄ depends positively on both ρ and σϵ , the first term of u∗ is also
increasing in ρ and σϵ . Therefore firms react aggressively to a greater uncertainty by increasing their productions for any given level of price and such behavior is further amplified by
higher degrees of risk-aversion. However, if all firms increase their production, in steady
state, the price will be smaller, so that the term κ̄ p∗ could either increase or decrease. Moreover, ϑ̄ depends on ρ and σϵ too. This suggests that establishing the overall effect of riskaversion and uncertainty on the optimal production strategy and on the equilibrium price
is a complicated endeavor.

9
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However, the following two Propositions confirm the intuition suggested by Lemma 2 as
they show that the steady state price is decreasing in the risk-adjustment coefficient and in
the volatility of demand shocks and that, ceteris paribus, the M firms produce larger quantities of the non-storable good.
Proposition 2 For any parametric constellation, the steady state price, p∗ , of the stationary equilibrium is decreasing in ρ, the coefficient of risk-aversion, and σϵ , the volatility of demand shocks.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 For any parametric constellation, in a stationary equilibrium, the expected quantity
produced by an oligopolistic firm in steady state, u∗ , is increasing in ρ, the coefficient of risk-aversion,
and σϵ , the volatility of demand shocks.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Summing up we conclude that uncertainty and risk aversion affect the strategies of firms
producing a homogeneous non-storable good in a dynamic oligopoly market with sticky
prices. In particular, we observe that the optimal firms’ reaction to a higher degree of uncertainty is to increase their production in order to reduce the variability of their payoffs. This
behavior is exacerbated when firms exhibit a higher degree of risk-aversion and it is driven
by the positive impact of ρ and σϵ on κ̄ that brings about an increase in the aggregate supply
of the good with a consequent reduction in its steady state price. This result is driven by the
Epstein and Zins recursive preferences employed in this paper. In fact, as it is discussed in
Vitale (2017) and Valentini and Vitale (2019), ρ > 0 implies that the relative risk-aversion is
greater than the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. Kreps and Porteus
(1978) show that under these circumstances agents are pushed towards an earlier resolution
of uncertainty vis-a-vis the standard case of expected utility.

3.2 The Number of Firms
Another interesting and apparently counterintuitive result pertains to the impact of the
number of firms in the oligopolistic market. This is introduced by the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 For any parametric choice κ̄ is increasing in M, the number of firms in the market.
Proof. See the Appendix.

10
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Lemma 3 shows that when the number of firms augments risk-averse entrepreneurs react
aggressively and indeed the increase in κ̄ captures their incentive to produce larger quantities of the non-storable good. This behavior suggests that firms prefer to sacrifice part of
their marginal revenues in order to protect their market share from the greater competitive
pressure due to an increase of M.
This result is in contradiction with the static Cournot oligopoly where the impact of the
number of firms on the production strategy of single firms is negative. However, Lemma 3
captures only part of the effect that M has on the production strategy as the overall effect
depends also on how the number of firms affect p∗ and ϑ̄. In fact, when the number of firms
raises to infinite, the steady state price converges to the firms’ marginal production cost, as
established in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 When the number of firms goes to infinity the steady state price p∗ converges to the
firms’ per period marginal production cost.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result is important in that it suggests that in the limit the strategic interaction between firms leads to a competitive equilibrium. The convergence of the steady state price
p∗ towards firms’ marginal cost in the limit case of M going to infinity was firstly showed
by Dockner (1988) in a dynamic oligopoly without uncertainty. Therefore, Proposition 4 reveals that i) Dockner’s result is robust to the introduction of uncertainty and risk-aversion
and ii) the degree of uncertainty and risk aversion do not affect the steady state price when
the number of firms producing a homogeneous non-storable good in the dynamic market
with sticky prices becomes infinity.

4

The Nexus Between Static and Dynamic Formulations

In order to deepen our understanding of the impact of risk-aversion and price stickiness on
a oligopoly, we now compare our dynamic formulation with a static one in which prices are
always equal to the level dictated by the demand schedule, while entrepreneurs are riskneutral. In such a static formulation two alternative scenarios can prevail. In the former
firms are price-takers and act competitively, while in the latter they act strategically as they
take into account the impact that their output has on the equilibrium price.
It is relatively simple to establish that in the former scenario the expected equilibrium
price for the homogeneous good, E[ pt ], is equal to pcomp =

α
1+ M ,

while the production strat-

egy of the individual firm implies that ut = κcomp pt , where κcomp = 1. When firms act strate11
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gically, instead, the expected equilibrium price is equal to pstra =
with κstrat =

2α
2+ M ,

while ut = κstrat pt

1
2.

We conjecture that the steady state of the stationary equilibrium of our dynamic formulation with sticky prices and risk-averse entrepreneurs lies in between the two extremes of the
strategic and competitive static equilibria. More precisely, we conjecture that the following
inequalities hold
pcomp ≤

p∗

≤ pstra ,

(14)

κcomp ≥

κ̄

≥ κstra .

(15)

These conjectures are substantiated by some numerical analysis alongside some analytical
results for special limit cases. In particular, we are able to determine what happens to the
steady steady of our dynamic formulation when time-discounting collapses to zero (δ ↓
0) and when prices become either infinitely sticky or perfectly flexible (s ↓ 0 and s ↑ ∞
respectively). Investigating these limit scenarios is interesting per se but also because they
help unveiling how risk-aversion, time-discounting and price stickiness interact.
Thus, for δ ↓ 0 the steady state of our dynamic formulation converges to the equilibrium
of the static model with price-taker firms, as suggested by the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 When the time-discounting factor falls to zero the steady state price of the stationary
equilibrium with M firms converges to the expected price, E[ pt ], of the static equilibrium with pricetaker firms, in that
lim p∗ = pcomp .
δ ↓0

Proof. See the Appendix.
This result is not surprising. In fact, as δ collapses to zero firms do not take into account
future profit opportunities when selecting their production policies. Moreover, since prices
are sticky firms’ current output only affects future prices. Consequently, as current prices
are not affected by their current production choices, firms just behave as price-taker agents.
A second implication of Proposition 5 is that for δ ↓ 0 the steady state of our dynamic formulation coincides with the competitive equilibrium of the static formulation of the model
presented by Fershtman and Kamien (1987).6 Indeed, in our formulation firms, when choosing their output, know the current price for the homogeneous good, but are uncertain about
its future values. Thus, their risk-aversion affects their production strategies insofar they
6 More

precisely, this happens for M = 2 when in their formulation the linear cost coefficient is set equal to
zero, ie. c = 0.
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care for future profits. When δ ↓ 0 they no take into account future profits and hence their
uncertainty about future prices and their risk-aversion become irrelevant.
The steady state of our dynamic formulation manifests similar properties when prices
become infinitely sticky. In fact, also when s collapses to zero our steady state converges
to the equilibrium of the static model with price-taker firms. This result is posited in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 6 When prices become infinitely sticky (s ↓ 0), the steady state price of the stationary
equilibrium converges to the expected price, E[ pt ], of the static equilibrium with M price-taker firms,
in that
lim p∗ = pcomp .
s ↓0

Proof. See the Appendix.
In this extreme scenario firms are aware that their output does not affect prices. In addition, while they care for future profit opportunities they also know that their current decisions will not bear upon the future. Consequently, firms act as price-taker agents which
maximize their expected current profits exactly as in Fershtman and Kamien’s original formulation.
When prices become perfectly flexible the properties of the steady state of our formulation
change dramatically, as shown in the following Proposition.
Proposition 7 When prices become perfectly flexible (s ↑ ∞), the steady state price of the stationary
equilibrium converges to a limit value which for M ≥ 2 lies between the expected price, E[ pt ], of
the static equilibrium with price-taker firms and that of the static equilibrium with strategic firms, in
that
pcomp < lim p∗ < pstrat ,
s↑∞

while for M = 1 coincides with the expected price, E[ pt ], of the static equilibrium with a strategic
monopolist, in that
lim p∗ = pstrat .
s↑∞

Proof. See the Appendix.
When prices become perfectly flexible they immediately adjust to the level determined by
the demand for the homogeneous good. This means that the management of a monopolistic firm will choose its production policy taking into account the immediate and complete
impact that this will have on the the price of the homogeneous good. More precisely, in t
it will select the optimal production quantity u(t) considering its effect through the inverse
13
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demand schedule p(t) = α − u(t). In this way the monopolist acts as a single strategic agent
and the steady state of the stationary equilibrium converges to the corresponding static equilibrium.
Interestingly, in oligopoly the steady state of the stationary equilibrium does not converge
to the corresponding static equilibrium with strategic firms. The steady state price is in fact
smaller. This is because in oligopoly firms not only consider the impact that their output
has on the equilibrium price, but also on the output of their competitors. Thus, a firm’s
management knows that if it increases its output not only it will depress the price of the
homogeneous good, but it will also induce the other firms to produce less. Firms find it
optimal to eat into their competitors’ market shares and hence choose to increase output
above the level consistent with the static equilibrium with strategic firms.
Proposition 7 shows that with perfectly flexible prices, for M ≥ 2, the limit steady state
price of the stationary equilibrium can be considered a weighted average of the expected
equilibrium prices which prevail in the static equilibrium under competitive and strategic
behavior, in that
lim p∗ = ω pstrat + (1 − ω ) pcomp .
s↑∞

In particular, for M = 2 pstrat = 12 α and pcomp = 31 α, while ω =

√
2 √
2/3
1+2 2/3

which coincides

with the corresponding formula presented by Fershtman and Kamien (1987) when production costs do not include a linear component, ie. for c = 0 in their formulation,
lim p∗ =
s↑∞

√
pcomp + 2 √2
3
√
2
1 + 2√
3

pstrat

.

Indeed, for M = 2, when s ↑ ∞ our formulation collapses to the stochastic analogue
of the static model discussed by Fershtman and Kamien (1987). This suggests that when
prices become perfectly flexible the impact of uncertainty and risk-aversion on the firms’
production strategies and the market equilibrium in our dynamic formulation dissipates.
Indeed, this is a general result which we posit in the following Proposition.
Proposition 8 When prices become perfectly flexible (s ↑ ∞), the production strategies of the riskaverse entrepreneurs collapse to those of their risk-neutral counterparts.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for this result is immediate. In fact, as prices become perfectly flexible they
immediately converge to the level determined by the demand for the homogeneous good.
14
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This implies that uncertainty over future prices vanquishes and the optimal production
strategy of the oligopolistic firms is unaffected by the entrepreneurs’ degree of risk-aversion.
We conclude that the impact of risk-aversion and uncertainty on the optimal production
strategies of oligopolistic firms crucially hinges on the stickiness of the good price. Only
when prices adjust slowly the attitude of the firms’ management and their uncertainty on
the dynamics of future prices affect their production decisions.
The results illustrated in Propositions 5 to 7 pertain to limit scenarios. However, numerical
analysis conducted for other parametric constellations comforts the main conclusions we
have drawn so far. Thus, in Figure 1 we plot the steady-state price, p∗ , and the production
coefficient, κ̄, against the time discounting factor δ and compare them to the corresponding
reference values for the static formulation both when M = 1 and M = 2. In Figure 2 we
repeat the same exercise with respect to the degree of price stickiness, 1/s.
Figure 1 reveals that, both when M = 1 and M = 2, for δ > 0 the coefficient κ̄ is smaller in
the dynamic version and hence that, as firms produce more slowly, the equilibrium price is
larger. The difference stems from the fact that in the dynamic model firms take into account
the impact of their current production choice on future prices and profits and optimally
decide to restrain their production. However, consistently with Propositions 5 when δ ↓ 0,
as concern for future profits vanquishes, the optimal production policy collapses to that of
the static formulation with price-taking behavior. In fact, both when M = 1 and M = 2, for
δ ↓ 0 κ̄ ↑ κcomp , where κcomp is the coefficient κ of the static formulation with price-taking
behavior. Interestingly, Figure 1 also shows that convergence to this limit case is fairly slow,
in that for δ close to zero there is some sizable difference between the static equilibrium and
the steady-state of the dynamic one.
Figure 2 confirms our conjecture that the steady state price of the dynamic formulation lies
between the expected equilibrium prices that prevail in the static formulation when firms
act as price-taker agents and strategic ones. In fact, for any value of 1/s, pcomp ≤ p∗ ≤ pstrat .
Similarly we see that, as conjectured, κcomp ≥ κ̄ ≥ κstrat . Moreover, from the Figure we see
that as 1/s increases, both when M = 1 and M = 2, the steady state price, p∗ , decreases,
while the corresponding production coefficient, κ̄ increases. This unveils a clear monotonic
relationship between the degree of price stickiness and the characteristics of the dynamic
equilibrium. In particular, as prices adjust more slowly, firms find it optimal to produce
more so that the steady state price drops.
In addition, consistently with Proposition 6, we see that as 1/s rises to infinity, and hence
prices become infinitely sticky, the steady state of the dynamic formulation converges to the
corresponding static equilibrium with price-taker firms both when M = 1 and M = 2. On
the contrary, coherently with Proposition 7, when 1/s drops to zero, and prices become per15
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Figure 1: Dependence of p∗ and κ̄ on δ for M = 1 (top panels) and M = 2 (bottom panels) with s = 1, α = 10, ρ = 1 and σϵ2 = 0.1. The continuous lines
represent the values of p∗ and κ̄ for the dynamic formulation, the dotted ones represent the corresponding values of the static formulation with price-taker
firms.

p*

7

Valentini and Vitale: Uncertainty and Risk-aversion in a Dynamic Oligopoly with St

16

19

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1262 [2019]

fectly flexible, while for M = 1 the steady state of the dynamic formulation approaches the
corresponding static equilibrium with a strategic monopolist, for M = 2 it does not converge
to the corresponding static equilibrium with strategic firms. Indeed, in the latter scenario the
limit steady state price is smaller than the equilibrium price of the static formulation with
strategic firms, while the corresponding production coefficient is larger.

Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown how price stickiness, uncertainty and risk aversion interact in oligopolistic markets of homogeneous and non-storable goods. Such markets are not just a theoretical
curiosity. Electricity, for instance, is perfectly homogeneous, difficult to store and typically
provided by few firms in retail markets which are characterized by demand uncertainty and
prices adjusting very slowly to changes in the wholesale electricity prices.
To analyze these markets we have extended a classical dynamic oligopoly game with
sticky prices by developing a discrete-time formulation that allows to introduce uncertainty
and risk-aversion via recursive preferences à la Hansen and Sargent (1995). Starting from
a discrete-time formulation allows both to move easily to the continuous-time counterpart
and to put in evidence the role of price stickiness and uncertainty in our results. In fact,
focusing on the infinite horizon limit of the continuous- time formulation, we have obtain
several results that we can compare to those already known in the extant literature. Thus,
we have seen that as uncertainty and risk-aversion increase, firms produce more and, consequently, the equilibrium price falls. However, the effect of uncertainty and risk-aversion
on production and price levels crucially depends on the presence of price stickiness as it
is greater when price stickiness increases and disappears when prices can adjust instantaneously. Indeed, since uncertainty on price dynamics pertains solely to next periods, the
strategic behavior of risk-averse firms collapses that of risk-neutral ones when the current
price can converge instantaneously to its equilibrium value. Therefore, the introduction of
uncertainty and risk aversion does not help to cope with the Fershtman and Kamien’s issue
of non-convergence towards the static Cournot equilibrium price when we remove price
stickiness and firms use feedback strategies.
This paper provides a preliminary analysis of the impact of uncertainty and risk-aversion
within a dynamic oligopoly game with stick prices. Such analysis could be extended in several directions. In particular, consumption decisions could be incorporated by introducing
financial assets. Similarly, a storable good would allow to smooth production and reduce
profit variability. However, despite its possible limitations, the model we presented per-
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mits immediate comparison with Fershtman and Kamien (1987) and the related literature
on dynamic oligopoly games with sticky prices within a deterministic context.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose firm 1’s entrepreneur conjectures that in n firms 2, 3, . . ., M will all choose to produce the
same quantity ∆yn . In addition, assume that V n+1 = πn+1 p2n+1 − 2ϑn+1 + νn+1 , where πn+1 and
ϑn+1 are some time-variant coefficients. Under this assumption, Lemma 4 in Vitale (2017) shows that
solving the recursion in (3) is equivalent to solving the double recursion
Fn ( pn )
e ϕ( p)
L

e Fn+1 ( pn+1 ) , where Fn+1 ≡ πn+1 p2
LL
n+1 − 2ϑn+1 ,

=

[

1 1 2
max δπ ( p + ϵ) − 2δϑ ( p + ϵ) −
ϵ
ϵ
ρ σϵ2 ∆

=

[

L ϕ( p)

]

2

and

(

)]

min ∆c + ϕ αs∆ + (1 − s∆) p − s∆ [u + ( M − 1)y ]

=

u

.

e operator to Fn+1 we find that L
e Fn+1 ( pn+1 ) = π̃n+1 p2 − 2ϑ̃n+1 pn+1 with π̃n+1 =
Applying the L
n +1
δ∆ πn+1 (1 − δ∆ ρ σϵ2 ∆ πn+1 )−1 , ϑ̃n+1 = δ∆ ϑn+1 (1 − δ∆ ρ σϵ2 ∆ πn+1 )−1 and the second order condition
that δ∆ πn+1 −

1 1
ρ σϵ2

< 0, which will always be satisfied insofar πn+1 < 0.

In applying the L operator to Fn+1 ( pn+1 ) = π̃n+1 p2n+1 − 2ϑ̃n+1 pn+1 we find the following first
order condition
(

1
+ s2 ∆π̃n+1
2

)

(
un −

1
s(1 − s∆)π̃n+1 +
2

)
pn + ( M − 1)s2 ∆π̃n+1 yn − s(αs∆π̃n+1 − ϑ̃n+1 ) = 0

and hence the optimal production is
un =

+ s(1 − s∆)π̃n+1
pn +
+ ( M − 1)s2 ∆π̃n+1

1
2
1
2

1
2

( M − 1)s∆π̃n+1
yn +
+ ( M − 1)s2 ∆π̃n+1

1
2

s(αs∆π̃n+1 − ϑ̃n+1 )
.
+ ( M − 1)s2 ∆π̃n+1

Crucially, firm 1’s conjecture will need to be verified in equilibrium. This is trivially achieved by
assuming a symmetric equilibrium in that we posit that un = yn . Under such restriction we find that
un = κ p,n pn + κe,n (αs∆π̃n+1 − ϑ̃n+1 ) , with
κ p,n =

1
2

+ s(1 − s∆)π̃n+1
and κe,n =
+ M s2 ∆π̃n+1

1
2

1
2

s
.
+ Ms2 ∆π̃n+1

Inserting this expression into the argument of the L operator it is found that
πn =

[
]2
1
∆ κ 2p,n − ∆ κ p,n + (1 − s∆) − M s ∆ κ p,n π̃n+1 ,
2

ϑn = [1 − ( M − 1)sπ̃n+1 ∆ κe,n ][− Ms ∆ κ p,n + (1 − s∆)](ϑ̃n+1 − αs∆π̃n+1 ) . 2
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Proof of Proposition 1
Reconsider the optimal production strategy described in Lemma 1. In the limit, for ∆ converging to
zero

( M−1)s∆π̃n+1
1
2
2 +( M −1) s ∆ π̃n+1

→ 0. In addition, for ∆ ↓ 0, as π̃n+1 → π (t) (while ϑ̃n+1 → ϑ(t)),

converges to 1 + 2sπ (t), while

s(αs∆π̃n+1 −ϑ̃n+1 )
+ ( M−1)s2 ∆π̃n+1

1
2

1
2 + s (1− s∆ ) π̃n+1
1
2
2 +( M −1) s ∆ π̃n+1

converges to −2sϑ (t).

Hence, in the limit, the optimal demand function for firm 1 in t is
u(t) = κ (t) p(t) − 2 s ϑ (t) , with κ (t) = 1 + 2 s π (t) ,
where κ (t) = lim∆↓0 κ p,n , 2s = lim∆↓0 κe,n , π (t) = lim∆↓0 πn and ϑ (t) = lim∆↓0 ϑn . To identify the limit
functions π (t) and ϑ (t), firstly consider that since [(1 − s∆) − M s∆ κn ]2 = (1 − 2s∆) − 2 M s ∆ κn +
o (∆2 ), it follows that equation (7) can also be written as
(
πn = π̃n+1 + ∆

1 2
κ
− κ p,n − 2s π̃n+1 − 2 M s κ p,n π̃n+1
2 p,n

)

+ o ( ∆2 ) ,

where o (∆) indicates a term of order ∆ or superior. This implies that
π n − π n +1
∆

=

π̃n+1 − πn+1
− 2s π̃n+1 + κ p,n
∆

(

1
κ p,n − 1 − 2 M s π̃n+1
2

)

+ o (∆) .

Notice, that it can be established that
(
κn

1
κ p,n − 1 − 2 M s π̃n+1
2
π n − π n +1
∆

)

=

= − dπdt(t) , lim∆↓0

1
2

(

+ sπ̃n+1
+ M s2 ∆π̃n+1
1
2

1
2

)(

1
2

+ (2M − 1) sπ̃n+1
1
2
2 + M s ∆ π̃n+1

)

+ o (∆) .

π̃n+1 − πn+1
∆

= ln δ π (t) + ρσϵ2 π (t)2 and lim∆↓0 π̃n+1 = lim∆↓0 πn+1 =
)
(
π (t). Given the expression above we also see that lim∆↓0 κ p,n 12 κ p,n − 1 − 2 M s π̃n+1 = −2 ( 12 +

Now, lim∆↓0

sπ (t))( 12 + (2M − 1) sπ (t)). We conclude that in the limit π (t) solves the following differential
equation
dπ (t)
− 2
dt

(

1
sπ (t) +
2

)(

1
(2M − 1)sπ (t) +
2

)

− 2s π (t) + ln δ π (t) + ρσϵ2 π (t)2 = 0 .

Similarly, equation (8) can also be written as follows
(

)

ϑn = ϑ̃n+1 − ∆ s + M s κ p,n + ( M − 1) s κe,n π̃n+1 + o (∆) ϑ̃n+1 − ∆(α s + o (∆)) π̃n+1 ,
so that
ϑn − ϑn + 1
∆

=

ϑ̃n+1 − ϑn+1
−
∆

Considering that lim∆↓0

ϑn − ϑn +1
∆

(

)
s + M s κ p,n + ( M − 1) s κe,n π̃n+1 ϑ̃n+1 − α sπ̃n+1 + o (∆)) .

= − dϑdt(t) , lim∆↓0

ϑ̃n+1 − ϑn+1
∆

= ln δ ϑ (t) + ρσϵ2 π (t)ϑ(t), lim∆↓0 ϑ̃n+1 =

lim∆↓0 ϑn+1 = ϑ (t) and that lim∆↓0 κ p,n = 1 + 2sπ (t)) and lim∆↓0 κe,n π̃n+1 = 2s π (t), we conclude that
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in the limit ϑ (t) solves the second differential equation
dϑ (t)
+
dt

(

)

(

ln δ − (1 + M)s ϑ (t) −

)
2(2M − 1)s −

ρσϵ2

2

π (t)ϑ (t) − απ (t) = 0 . 2

Before we prove Lemma 2 and the various Propositions we presented in Sections 2.2 to 4, we
establish a few preliminary results.
Lemma 4 In a stationary equilibrium limt↓−∞ π (t) = π̄ where
π̄ = −

(
)
1 λ 1D
+
with λ = 2(1 + M )s − ln δ and γ = 2(2M − 1)s2 − ρσϵ2 .
2γ 2 γ

Proof. Consider the differential equation for π (t). We can write it as

d π (t)
dt

= 12 + λπ (t) + γπ (t)2 . This

can be transformed into a homogeneous ordinary differential equation of order two,
1
2 γz ( t )

= 0, with π (t) = − γ1

d z(t)
dt

z(t)

d2 z ( t )
d2 t

−λ

d z(t)
dt

+

. Assume then that z(t) = m exp(ζ t). We have a solution of the

t) − ζλm exp(ζ t) + 21 γm, exp(ζ t) = 0 , ie. iff mζ 2 − mλζ + m 21 γ = 0. This admits
{
ζ 1 = 12 λ + 12 D
two roots equal to ζ =
, with D = [λ2 − 2γ]1/2 . Thus, z(t) = m1 exp(ζ 1 t) +
1
1
ζ2 = 2 λ − 2 D
ODE iff

ζ 2 m exp(ζ

m2 exp(ζ 2 t). Given that π (t) = − γ1

d z(t)
dt

z(t)

m ζ exp(ζ 1 t)+m2 ζ 2 exp(ζ 2 t)
.
1 exp( ζ 1 t )+ m2 exp( ζ 2 t ))

, we can write that π (t) = − γ(1m1

We can impose the terminal condition π ( T ) = 0 to find that
m1 ζ 1 exp(ζ 1 T ) + m2 ζ 2 exp(ζ 2 T ) = 0 ⇔ m2 = −

ζ1
ζ1
m1 exp((ζ 1 − ζ 2 ) T ) = − m1 exp(D T ) .
ζ2
ζ2

Re-inserting this expression in that for π (t) we find that
1
π (t) = −
γ

(

ζ 1 exp(ζ 1 t) − ζ 1 exp(D T ) exp(ζ 2 t)

)

(

1 − exp(D T ) exp(−(ζ 1 − ζ 2 ) t)

1 − ζζ 12 exp(D T ) exp(−(ζ 1 − ζ 2 ) t)
exp(D T ) exp(ζ 2 t)
)
)
(
(
1 − exp(− D (t − T ))
ζ1
exp( D ( T − t)) − 1
ζ1
= −
,
= −
ζ1
γ
γ
1 − ζζ 12 exp(−D (t − T ))
ζ 2 exp(D ( T − t )) − 1
exp(ζ 1 t) −

ζ1
ζ2

ζ
= − 1
γ

as ζ 1 − ζ 2 = D . Importantly, we can find the stationary value of π pushing t to −∞,
lim π (t) = π̄ = −

t↓−∞

Notice also that π̄ corresponds to the root π̄+ = − 21
γπ̄ 2 + λπ̄ +

1
2

ξ2
.2
γ
λ
γ

+

1 D
2 γ

of the following quadratic equation

= 0, which is obtained from the differential equation (12) by imposing that π (t) = π̄

and dp(t)/dt = 0.
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Lemma 5 For any parametric constellation κ̄ is positive
Proof. Let w denote sπ̄ with w. From the expression solved by π̄ we see that w is a root of the
)
(
(
)
2
quadratic equation Aw2 − Bw + 21 = 0, where A = 2(2M − 1) − ρ σs2ϵ and B = 2(1 + M ) − lns δ .
√

Now w > −1/2. To verify this inequality notice that it is equivalent to the condition that B− BA −2A >
√
√
−1. This is equivalent to B + A > B2 − 2A for A > 0 and B + A < B2 − 2A for A < 0. In the
√
former case, as we take squared values, we see that B + A > B2 − 2A corresponds to A2 + 2A +
2

AB > 0. This is inequality is obviously satisfied as both A and B are positive. In the latter case, as
√
A < 0 we notice that B2 − 2A > B > B + A. Because w > − 12 we conclude that κ̄ = 1 + 2w is
positive. 2
Lemma 6 For any parametric constellation p∗ is positive
dp(t)
=
dt
+ 2s2 Mϑ̄

Proof. In a stationary symmetric equilibrium,
κ̄ p(t) − 2sϑ̄. It follows that

dp(t)
dt

= αs − Ap(t)

it is immediately to derive that the steady state price is

p∗

αs − sp(t) − sMu(t) + ϵ(t) and u(t) =

+ ϵ(t), with A = s (1 + M κ̄ ). From this
= A−1 (αs + 2Ms2 ϑ̄). Consider that from

the differential equation (13) it can be concluded that in a stationary equilibrium ϑ̄ = ln δ−s(1α+π̄sM)−γ π̄ .
(
)
2Ms2 π̄
Substituting the expression for ϑ̄ into that for p∗ we conclude that p∗ = αs
1
+
.
A
ln δ−s (1+ M )−γπ̄
Then, notice that we can write ln δ − s(1 + M) − γπ̄ = ln δ − s(1 + M ) + s(1 + M) − 21 ln δ − 12 D =
1
2

(ln δ − D) ≡ Q. Since both Q and π̄ are negative, while A = s(1 + Mκ̄ ) is positive we conclude

that p∗ is positive. 2
Lemma 7 In a stationary equilibrium, for any parametric constellation, the expected quantity produced by an
oligopolistic firm in is positive.
Proof. In a stationary symmetric equilibrium, the expected quantity produced by a generic firm is
(
)
(
)
u∗ = κ̄ p∗ − 2sϑ̄. Hence, consider that p∗ = (1+1Mκ̄ ) α + 2Msϑ̄ . Therefore, u∗ = 1+1Mκ̄ κ̄α − 2sϑ̄ ,

which will be positive if κ̄α − 2sϑ̄ > 0. Then, consider the expressions for κ̄ = 1 + 2sπ̄ and ϑ̄ = αQπ̄s .
[
(
) ]
Substituting the expressions for κ̄ and ϑ̄ into that for u∗ , we find that u∗ = α 12 + QQ−1 sπ̄ . Because
0<

Q −1
Q

< 1. Then, since sπ̄ > − 21 , as seen in the proof of Lemma 5, we see that u∗ is positive. 2

Proof of Lemma 2.
As indicated π̄ corresponds to a particular root of the equation γπ̄ 2 + λπ̄ +

1
2

= 0. Then, we rely on

a graphical argument. In Figures A.1 and A.2 we show how the determination of π̄+ changes when
either ρ or σϵ2 augments. In Figure A.1 we consider the case in which γ is positive, while in Figure
A.2 that in which it is negative.
Both Figures allow to determine what happens when an increase in ρ and/or in σϵ2 brings about
a reduction inγ. In both cases graphical inspection shows that for a larger degree of risk-aversion
and/or a larger volatility of the demand shocks the stationary value π̄, which is always negative,
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γ′ π 2

γ π2

π̄ ′
π̄
b

b

π

− 12
− 12 − λπ

Figure A.1: The determination of π̄ for γ > 0. For any choice of ρ and σϵ2 there are two interceptions between
the straight line (− 21 − λπ) and the parabola (γπ 2 ). That closer to the origin corresponds to π̄+ = − 12 γλ +
1 D
2 γ.

When either ρ or σϵ2 rises, so that γ falls to γ′ , the parabola moves downward (while the straight line is
unaffected given that λ is independent of these two parameters) and the stationary value moves up to π̄ ′ .

rises. Then, since κ̄ = 1 + 2s π̄ and s is positive we see that κ̄ is increasing in π̄. Then, we conclude
that for a larger ρ and/or a larger σϵ2 κ̄ is larger. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.
We have seen in the proof of Lemma 6 that p∗ =

αs
A

(
1 +

2M s2 π̄
ln δ − s (1 + M) − γ π̄

)
. Then, we notice that in

Lemma 2 we proved that π̄ and κ̄ are increasing in ρ and σϵ . In addition, we notice that A = s(1 + Mκ̄ )
is positive and increasing in κ̄. This implies that s(1 + Mκ̄ ) is increasing in ρ and σϵ . This means that
to establish our result we need to prove that the derivatives of the ratio

2M s2 π̄
ln δ − s(1 + M ) − γ π̄

with respect

to ρ and with respect to σϵ are negative, so that this ratio is proved to be decreasing in these two
parameters. Consider that this ratio can also be written as

G π̄
H − I π̄ ,

where G > 0 and H < 0. The

derivative of this ratio wrt ρ (equivalently with respect to σϵ ) is
1
( H − I π̄ )2

[
G ( H − I π̄ )

(
)]
]
[
dπ̄
dπ̄
dI
G
dπ̄
2 dI
− G π̄ − I
−
π̄
=
H
+
π̄
.
dρ
dρ
dρ
( H − I π̄ )2
dρ
dρ

This expression is negative. In fact,
and

dπ̄
dρ

is positive. Finally, π̄ 2

applies to σϵ . This proves that

G
( H − I π̄ )2

is positive, while H

dπ̄
dρ

dI
dI
dρ is negative because clearly dρ is
p∗ is decreasing in both ρ and σϵ . □

is negative, since H is negative

negative. An identical argument
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π̄
b

π

b

π̄ ′ 1
−2

γ π2

− 12 − λπ

γ′ π 2

Figure A.2: The stationary value π̄ for γ < 0. For any choice of ρ and σϵ2 there are two interceptions between
the straight line (− 21 − λπ) and the parabola (γπ 2 ). That smaller one corresponds to π̄+ = − 21 γλ + 12 D
γ . When
2
′
either ρ or σϵ rises, so that γ falls to γ , the parabola moves downward, while the straight line is unaffected
since λ does not depend on either of these two parameters, and the stationary value moves up to π̄ ′ .
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Proof of Proposition 3.

[
(
) ]
In the proof of Lemma 7 we have seen that u∗ = α 12 + QQ−1 sπ̄ , where 0 < QQ−1 < 1 and − 21 <
(
)
sπ̄ < 0. Notice that QQ−1 sπ̄ is negative. However, in the proof of Lemma 2 we have established
that π̄, while negative, is increasing in ρ and σϵ2 . In addition, Q is negative and decreasing in both ρ
and σϵ2 , while
either ρ or

σϵ2

Q −1
Q

is positive and increasing in Q. Combining these results we conclude that when

rises u∗ augments. 2

Proof of Lemma 3.
In the proof of Lemma 2 we have seen that π̄ corresponds to π̄+ = − 12

λ
γ

+

considering the intersection between the parabola γ π̄ 2 and the straight line

1 D
2 γ . This can be found
− 12 − λπ̄. In Figure A.3

we have a graphical representation of two functions for γ positive. In this case π̄+ corresponds to the
larger of the two negative roots. When M augments graphical inspection shows that π̄ rises.

γ′ π 2

γ π2

′
π̄ π̄
b

b

π

− 12
− 21 − λ′ π

− 12 − λπ

Figure A.3: The stationary value π̄ for γ positive. For any choice of M there are two interceptions between the
straight line and the parabola. That closer to the origin corresponds to π̄+ = − 12 γλ + 12 D
γ . When M increases
′
′
λ rises to λ and γ to γ . This means that the straight line rotates clockwise, while the parabola moves upward.
The stationary value moves up to π̄ ′ .

For γ negative, when M rises, graphical inspection does not allow to determine the direction in
which π̄ changes in that the shifts in the straight line and parabola push π̄ in opposite directions
as illustrated by Figure A.4. To determine the prevailing effect on π̄ we need to apply an implicit
function argument.
Given that the equation γ π̄ 2 + λ π̄ +
∂F
∂π̄

dπ̄ = 0, which implies that

dπ̄
dM

1
2

= 0, can be written as F ( M, π̄ ) = 0, so that dF =

∂F ∂F
= − ∂M
/ ∂π̄ . Now,

dF
dπ̄

= 2γ π̄ + λ and

∂F
∂M

∂F
∂M

dM +

= 2s π̄ (2sπ̄ + 1).

We consider the sign of such derivative for π̄ = π̄+ . Since λ > 0, for γ negative γπ̄+ > 0 and hence
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π̄ ′
b

π

b

π̄ 1
−2

− 21 − λ′ π

γ′ π 2

− 12 − λπ

γ π2

Figure A.4: The stationary value π̄ for γ negative. For any choice of M there are two interceptions between
the straight line and the parabola. One is negative and the other positive. The former corresponds to π̄+ =
′
′
− 21 γλ + 21 D
γ . When M increases λ rises to λ and γ to γ . This means that the straight line rotates clockwise,
while the parabola moves upward. The stationary value moves to π̄ ′ .
dF
∂F
dπ̄ is positive. In addition, since 2s π̄+ < 0, ∂π̄ is negative iff 2s π̄+ + 1 > 0. If this is established then
1
s 1
dπ̄
dM > 0. To see that 2s π̄+ + 1 > 0 consider that when γ is negative π̄+ > − 2λ , so that − s π̄+ < 2 λ .
Then, if 2s λ1 is smaller than 1/2 at fortiori −2sπ̄+ < 1 and hence 2sπ̄+ + 1 > 0. To see that 2s λ1 < 1/2
consider that this is equivalent to 12 s < 21 λ ⇔ 12 s < 2(1 + M) s − ln δ , which is really the case

as ln δ is negative. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.
Consider π̄, which solves the equation γπ̄ 2 + λπ̄ +

1
2

= 0. As M ↑ ∞ both λ and γ tend to infinity

(just recall their definitions) and hence π̄ converges to zero (just consider the graphical inspection of
Figure A.1. for λ and γ raising to infinity). From this it follows that κ̄ = 1 + 2sπ̄ → 1.
(
)
2M s2 π̄
Now recall that p∗ = αs
1
+
, where A = s(1 + Mκ̄ ). Using the latter result
A
ln δ − s (1 + M ) − γ π̄
we see that for M ↑ ∞ A converges to ∞. In addition the ratio
2s2 π̄

ln δ − s − γ π̄
M

−s

2M s2 π̄
ln δ − s (1 + M ) − γ π̄

can also be written as

which clearly converges to zero for M ↑ ∞. From this we conclude that p∗ converges to

zero for M ↑ ∞.
Notice also that for M ↑ ∞ ϑ̄ converges to zero too. To see this consider that in an infinite horizon
dϑ (t)

formulation π (t) and ϑ (t) become invariant values, respectively π̄ and ϑ̄. This implies that dt = 0
(
)
)
(
and equation (13) simplifies to the following ln δ − (1 + M )s ϑ̄ − 2(2M − 1)s2 − ρσϵ2 π̄ ϑ̄ − αs π̄ =
0.
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We have seen that for M ↑ ∞ π̄ ↓ 0. Then, assume that ϑ̄ converges to a value different from
zero, say ϑ, for M ↑ ∞. Thence, the first term in the equation rises with M at the same rate (for
M large it will be proportional to M). The second term cannot rise with M at the same rate, as π̄
converges to zero when M ↑ ∞ (and hence for M large the second term in the equation will be less
than proportional to M). The third term converges to zero. Then, for M large the equation cannot be
satisfied. Consequently, we conclude that ϑ̄ must also converge to zero.
Now, recall from Proposition 1 that u(t) = κ̄ p(t) − 2 s ϑ̄. As we have just proved that for M ↑
∞, p∗ converges to zero, κ̄ converges to 1 and ϑ̄ converges to zero, we conclude that the quantity
produced in a steady state by a single firm is zero. As we have quadratic costs the marginal cost for
a production level equal to zero is also zero. In brief, we conclude that the marginal cost and the
steady state price coincide for M ↑ ∞. 2
Proof of Proposition 5.
It is sufficient to prove that for δ ↓ 0 both π̄ and ϑ̄ converge to zero, so that the optimal production
strategy for the M firms is u(t) = p(t), that is that in the static formulation when the firms’ management takes the good price as given. In addition, the steady state price, p∗ , converges to p∗ =

α
1+ M ,

which corresponds to the expected good price, Et [ pt ], in the static formulation when the firms’ management takes such price as given.
In order to prove that δ ↓ 0 π̄ converges to zero, once again, a graphical argument would suffice.
In particular, consider Figure A.5, which, without loss of generality, is drawn under the assumption
that γ > 0 (a similar analysis would apply for γ < 0).
Notice that as δ falls λ (λ = 2(1 + M)s − ln δ) increases, while γ (γ = 2(2M − 1)s − ρσϵ2 ) is
unaffected. This implies that as δ falls the straight line − 12 − λπ̄ rotates clock-wise and in the
limit becomes vertical. This implies that for δ ↓ 0 π̄ converges to zero. In the expression for ϑ̄
(ϑ̄ =

απ̄s
)
ln δ − s (1 + M ) − γ π̄

for δ ↓ 0 the denominator converges to −∞, while the numerator converges

to 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 6.
As before notice that for s ↓ 0 γ (γ = 2(2M − 1)s − ρσϵ2 ) converge to −ρσϵ2 , while λ (λ = 2(1 + M )s −
ln δ) converges to − ln δ. Thus, π̄ becomes the negative root of −ρσϵ2 π̄ 2 − ln δπ̄ +

1
2

= 0. This

implies that both sπ̄ and ϑ̄ converge to zero for s ↓ 0 and hence that u(t) = p(t), while the stationary
price converges to p∗ =

α
1+ M .

2

Proof of Proposition 7.
Recall from the Proof of Proposition 5 that in the static formulation, if the M firms are price takers,
then pcom =

α
1+ M .

In addition, it is immediate to see that if they are strategic pstrat =

This implies that pstrat = (1 + S) pcom , with S =
w = sπ̄ solves equation Aw2 + Bw +

1
2

M
2+ M .

2α
1+ M .

We have seen in the proof of Lemma 5 that

= 0. Given the expressions for A and B, it is immediate

to see that for s ↑ ∞ this equation converges to 2(2M − 1) x2 + 2(1 + M) x +

1
2

= 0, which implies

M−Γ
that lims↑∞ w = x ≡ − 21(+2M
, with Γ = [(1 + M )2 − (2M − 1)]1/2 = [ M2 + 2]1/2 . In the proof of
−1)
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γ π2

′
π̄ π̄
b

b

π

− 12
− 21 − λ′ π

− 12 − λπ

Figure A.5: The stationary value π̄ for γ positive. For any choice of M there are two interceptions between the
straight line and the parabola. That closer to the origin corresponds to π̄+ = − 12 γλ + 21 D
γ . When δ falls λ rises
to λ′ , while γ is unaffected. This means that the straight line rotates clockwise, while the parabola does not
move. The stationary value moves up to π̄ ′ . For δ ↓ 0 λ ↑ ∞ and the straight line becomes infinitely steep.

Proposition 2 we have seen that
p

∗

=

α
1 + Mκ̄

(

2Ms w
1+
ln δ − s(1 + M ) − 2(2M − 1)sw + ρσϵ2

)
.

For s ↑ ∞ it converges to
lim p
s↑∞

∗

=

α
lims↑∞ 1 + Mκ̄

(

1 + M + 2( M − 1) x
(1 + M) + 2(2M − 1) x

)
.

Consider that κ̄ = 1 + 2sπ̄ = 1 + 2w. Then lims↑∞ κ̄ = 1 + 2x. This implies that lims↑∞ 1 + Mκ̄ =
(1+ M)( M−1)
+ 2MM−1 Γ. In addition, 1 + M + 2(2M − 1) x = Γ and
2M −1
M −1
∗
2M −1 Γ. Substituting in the expression for lims↑∞ p we find that

lim p
s↑∞

∗

=

α
Γ

(

(1 + M ) M + ( M − 1) Γ
(1 + M)( M − 1) + MΓ

This implies that lims↑∞ p∗ = pcomp

(

)

α
=
(1 + M ) Λ

M +( M −1)Λ
Λ[( M −1) + MΛ]

(

1 + M + 2( M − 1) x =

M + ( M − 1) Λ
( M − 1) + MΛ

)

that 0 < Λ < 1 so that 0 < R. Now for M = 1 R =

(1+ M ) M
2M −1

)
, where Λ =

+

Γ
.
1+M

M (1− Λ2 )
. Notice
Λ[ M +( M −1)Λ]
2
∗
lims↑∞ p = 3 α = pstrat , while

= pcomp (1 + R) with R =
1
3

= S, so that

for M ≥ 2 0 < R < S, so that pcomp < lims↑∞ p∗ < pstrat . In fact, the condition R ≤ S corresponds
to the inequality 2M2 + M − 2 ≤ M3 . For M = 1 left and right hand sides are equal, so that R = S,
while for M ≥ 2 the left hand side is smaller than the right hand side, so that R < S. 2
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Proof of Proposition 8.
It is sufficient to notice that for s ↑ ∞ κ̄ → 1 + 2x, where as shown in the proof of Proposition 7 x is
function only of the number of firms, M, while ϑ̄ → 0. To prove the latter notice that ϑ̄ =

αw
Q

and that

when s ↑ ∞, w → x, while Q ↑ ∞. In fact, Q = 12 D with D = [λ2 − 2γ]1/2 . Given the expression for
λ and γ for s very large D ≈ 2s(2 + M2 )1/2 . 2
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Supplementary Material
B.1 Stability of the Steady State.
It is interesting to determine the properties of the dynamics of the price of the non-storable good. In
this respect we have the following result.
Lemma 8 For any parametric constellation the steady state price p∗ is stable.
Proof. In the equation for the price dynamics,

dp(t)
dt

= αs − Ap(t) + 2s2 Mϑ̄ + ϵ(t), the coefficient A =

s(1 + Mκ̄ ) is positive. Then, for ϵ(t) ≡ 0 this dynamic system,
possesses a stable steady state for p∗ =

αs + 2M s2 ϑ̄

equivalently can be written as p(t) = p̂(t) +
that

A
p∗ .

dp(t)
dt

= α s − A p(t) + 2 s2 M ϑ̄ + ϵ(t),

. In fact, we can define p̂(t) ≡ p(t) − p∗ , which

Given that − Ap∗ + 2M s2 ϑ̄ + αs = 0, this implies

dp(t)
= − A ( p̂(t) + p∗ ) + 2M s2 ϑ̄ + αs + ϵ(t) = − A p̂(t) + ϵ(t)) .
dt

In the end, we conclude that as A > 0
[
Et

dp(t)
dt

]

> ( < ) 0 ⇐⇒

p̂(t) < ( > ) 0 ,

so that the steady state is stable. This is because when p̂(t) is positive, so that the price is above its
[
]
dp(t)
steady state value, Et dt is negative, that is the price is expected to fall (and viceversa if p̂(t) is
negative). This entails mean reversion of the price to the steady state value. 2
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